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Keynote Address:
The Death Penalty Dialogue Between
Law and Social Science
DAVID C. BALDUS*
I have followed the Capital Jury Project since its inception at a meeting of
the American Society of Criminology several years ago. The Project continues
a long tradition of collaboration between lawyers and social scientists on
important legal issues. I also believe the Project will make a significant
contribution to the dialogue on the death penalty between law and social
science. In my remarks today, I would like to discuss some features of this
dialogue, and highlight them with a few examples.
The concept of a dialogue is particularly appropriate because it is truly a
two-way conversation. The law, by articulating its assumptions and justifica-
tions, sets the research agenda for social scientists. Indeed, on some
occasions, courts invite social science research, and even give social scientists
advice about how to put together a proper research design. The resulting
social science research in turn influences opinions and beliefs about the death
penalty, which impacts death penalty decision-making at .many levels.
To be sure, the outcomes of that process are not always what some of us
would like to see. But this should come as no surprise since, for many
decision-makers in this process, the "facts" about the death penalty, as we
know them, have little impact on the way in which they cast their votes.
Nevertheless, the knowledge we produce strengthens some arguments and
weakens others. And among public officials who are concerned with the facts,
some minds and some votes are actually changed. In addition, the knowledge
that we produce impacts courts and legislators by making even more difficult
the hard cases that death penalty issues present to them. The knowledge that
we produce also spawns counterarguments and counterclaims designed to
reduce the implications of this new knowledge, and to reduce the discomfort
of public officials facing the dilemmas of death penalty issues. Further, the
justifications and decisions offered by courts and legislators, when confronted
with evidence about how the system actually operates, can expose more
clearly the values that are driving the decisions of legislators and judges.
These revelations in turn affect the perceived rationality and legitimacy of the
legal system.
Social science research is relevant to death penalty decision-making because
these institutions purport to be rational, principled, and guided by facts. And
when the facts are in dispute, the basic idea is that the side with the better
evidence should carry the day.
The problem with the* death penalty, however, is that there is often a
conflict between, on the one hand, widely held common sense understandings
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of how things work-this is what Lindblom and Cohen call "ordinary
knowledge" in their very important book Usable Knowledge'-and, on the
other hand, the specialized knowledge and expert opinion that flows from the
kind of research we do. Lindblom and Cohen correctly argue, I believe, that
expert knowledge generally provides only a small proportion of the knowledge
base for most decision-making. They explain that the principal contribution
of social science research to public policy analysis is to refine, focus, and
quantify the ordinary common sense understandings of decision-makers. I also
agree with their assessment that the congruence of the knowledge we produce
and ordinary understanding is an important determinant of the perceived
legitimacy of the specialized knowledge we generate.
Over the last two years, I have become particularly sensitive to the law and
social science dialogue. In my home state of Iowa, there is a campaign to
reinstate the death penalty, which was abolished in 1965. What strikes me-as
an active participant in this debate-is how much different the rhetoric is
today from what it would have been in 1973.
First, consider deterrence. The social science research on deterrence has had
a significant influence on popular opinion. Although that research does not
prove conclusively that the death penalty does not deter crime, it provides
very strong support for the proposition that if there is any marginal deterrent
effect from the death penalty, it is beyond our capacity to measure and
document.
This research has strongly affected the opinions of academics and the
general public. There are several reasons for this impact. First, the research
is of very high quality, and there is much of it. It employs alternative research
designs, and has been widely replicated in many states over many different
years;2 and there is a nearly complete consensus on the findings of this body
of research-with the notable exceptions of Isaac Ehrlich3 and Stephen
Layson.4 While much of this work is based on multivariate statistical
analysis, much of it is also extremely straightforward and understandable-in
the tradition of Thorsten Sellin-using time series and matched comparisons.
1. CHARLES E. LINDBLOM & DAVID K. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND
SOCIAL PROBLEM SOLVING 10 (1979).
2. See generally Richard 0. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases
of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1196-1224 (1981) (reviewing the empirical
research and literature on deterrence).
3. See Isaac Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Additional
Evidence, 85 J. POL. ECON. 741 (1977) (reporting the results of a multiple regression analysis which
suggests that each execution on average saves seven to eight innocent lives through deterrence); Isaac
Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397, 414 (1975).
4. See Stephen K. Layson, Homicide and Deterrence: A Reexamination of the United States Time-
Series Evidence, 52 S. ECON. J. 68, 80 (1985) (reporting the results of a multiple regression analysis
which suggests that each execution saves 18.5 lives).
5. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (Thorsten Sellin ed., 1967); THORSTEN SELLIN, THE DEATH
PENALTY: A REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (1959)
(employing cross-sectional comparisons of homicide rates in otherwise comparable states that do and
do not use the death penalty, and comparisons of homicide rates within given jurisdictions before and
after repeal or reinstatement of the death penalty).
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Second, the deterrence research conforms and resonates with common sense
understanding about the kind of cost-benefit analysis that killers go through
in making their decisions.
A third important point is that the National Research Council has endorsed
the validity of this research-and also undercut the perceived legitimacy of
the work of Isaac Ehrlich. 6
Finally, the deterrence research touches a core moral justification for the
death penalty. For this reason, it is avidly endorsed by opponents of the death
penalty.
You will remember that in Gregg v. Georgia,7 the United States Supreme
Court said that the deterrence research was inconclusive and that there was
"no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refuting" the
deterrence claim. 8 I will leave it to you to speculate whether the Court would
feel comfortable making that statement today.
What about the cost of the death penalty? For years it was assumed that the
death penalty saved money, but now that proposition is in serious doubt. The
widely quoted figure today is that each execution costs approximately $2
million. As Frank Zimring put it so nicely the other day, the reason is
simple-lawyers cost more than prison guards.
The consensus on this cost issue, however, is not nearly as strong as it is
on deterrence. The reason for this lack of consensus is that much of the work
is speculative. The principal exception is a recent study by Phil Cook and
Donna Slawson in North Carolina,9 which supports-very convincingly-the
$2 million estimate. But their study has not been widely replicated. Also, that
study, which I think is the best on this topic, is complex and difficult reading.
For example, a key finding of the study is that the most important determinant
of the average cost of an execution is the proportion of death sentences
imposed that are actually carried out. Cook's $2 million estimate rests on the
assumption that only ten percent of the death sentences imposed in North
Carolina actually result in an execution."0 If that figure is increased to, say,
thirty percent, the cost of each execution will decline dramatically; indeed, if
we executed everyone who was sentenced to death, the death penalty would
cost less than a system of long term imprisonment.
There are other problems as well. As noted earlier, if the results of a study
do not conform to common sense, or if they seem counter-intuitive, then they
are not likely to be influential. On the cost issue, I have found that the
"numbers can prove anything" argument maintains its legitimacy. In addition,
the cost problem appears to be something that can be fixed by changing the
6. See Lawrence R. Klein et al., The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An Assessment of
the Estimates, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 336, 338-49 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1986).
7. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
8. Id. at 185 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
9. PHILIP J. COOK & DONNA B. SLAWSON, THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH
CAROLINA 98 (1993).
10. Id. at 93.
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post-conviction process, so why not fix it? Finally, cost does not implicate
fundamental moral values in the same way that the deterrence research does.
I add, however, that with changing social values, and in particular the
growing public hostility toward taxation and government spending, the cost
implications of capital punishment are becoming increasingly important in a
way that I would never have predicted in 1973.
The empirical research of the last decade on miscarriages of justice has
given abolitionists one of their strongest arguments. Until ten years ago, the
evidence was quite speculative. Of course it was probable that innocent people
had been sentenced to death and executed, but it was not until the work of
Radelet and Bedau on this issue"-work I consider to be squarely in the
great social science tradition of quantifying and refining ordinary know-
ledge-that we learned not only the number of likely miscarriages, but also
how and why they occur.
Opponents of the death penalty can now persuasively argue that more than
one percent of the approximately 5000 death sentences imposed since 1973
involved a miscarriage ofjustice. Specifically, Radelet and Bedau have shown
that fifty-five of those sentences were imposed against people, innocent of any
crime, who were eventually released from prison, often with their lives
terribly shattered.'
2
This is elegant and meticulous research. It provides not only numbers and
rates, but also a deep understanding of how.these errors occur, how difficult
they are to avoid, and how nearly impossible they are to fix in terms of their
consequences for individuals. The work has withstood criticism very well,
particularly concerning the errors since 1973. The main counterargument
appears to be that at least none of these wrongly convicted people has actually
been executed. We hope this is true, but we do not really .know. Nor do we
know how many death sentences falsely imposed since 1973 remain
uncorrected.
The Radelet and Bedau research has another strength in the sense that it is
understandable and consistent with common sense understanding of the
inadequacy of governments and the imperfect ways in which important
decisions are often made. In truly striking ways, it implicates core moral
values and fears concerning the execution of innocent people.
In Iowa, the research on deterrence, cost, and miscarriages of justice has
clearly influenced the debate. Critics have dismissed it as "academic" opinion,
but for legislators concerned with how the death penalty system actually
functions, this information-this new knowledge-has had a significant
impact. In addition, this information has revealed how the reinstatement
campaign in Iowa is being driven essentially by public anger, fear, and
politics that have very little to do with crime control.
11. MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRoNEous CoNvICTIONS IN CAPITAL
CASES (1992).
12. This figure is based on Radelet and Bedau's ongoing research and is currently unavailable in
published form.
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Of course, the law and social science dialogue on the death penalty also
includes the United States Supreme Court, 3 and I would like to give you
just a couple of examples. A very important one, I think, is the 1983 case of
Barefoot v. Estelle.4 This case involved a challenge to the Texas statute
which asks the jury, as a predicate for the imposition of the death penalty,
"'whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society."" 5 These
predictions were largely informed by psychiatrists who routinely offered the
expert opinion that it was a virtual certainty that individual defendants
represented a continuing threat to society.
The use of these experts' opinions was challenged on the ground that they
are often erroneous, and that this use thereby introduces an unacceptable level
of arbitrariness into the jury decision-making process. Well, everyone knows
that expert opinion can be erroneous, but how often? This required proof, and
the petitioner produced, a sophisticated body of research that quantified the
error rate and showed that, in fact, the experts were wrong two-thirds of the
time. I6
There was a strong consensus in the research community about these
findings, which were beautifully pulled together by John Monahan, a
psychologist. 7 There were several reasons for the power of this body of
research. First, it was .of very high quality, and it had been widely replicated
in many different contexts. There was no significant dissent as to the validity
of the work. It was understandable and straightforward. And it was consistent
with common sense understandings of how difficult it is for individuals to
make decisions of this complexity under such uncertain circumstances. The
research was also endorsed by a highly reputable organization, the American
Psychiatric Association, which had no special interest in the death penalty. In
addition, the research hit a strong moral chord, since the prediction of future
dangerousness was virtually always the sole basis for the jury's death-
sentencing decision in Texas.
It is very clear from reading Barefoot v. Estelle that these data greatly
intensified the Court's dilemma. On the one hand, the Court had the choice
of affirming a death-sentencing system heavily biased toward error. On the
other hand, reversal and a declaration of unconstitutionality would have
affected hundreds of Texas death-sentencing decisions, at great political cost
to the Court. Also, some of the Justices very likely wondered whether there
13. See generally Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Unpleasant Facts: The Supreme Court's Response to
Empirical Research on Capital Punishment, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. LEGAL AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES 177 (Kenneth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi eds., 1988) (examining the
Court's responses to the empirical data on the deterrent effect of capital punishment, racial
discrimination in sentencing, and the biases of death-qualified juries).
14. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
15. Id. at 884 n.1 (quoting TEXAS CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (West 1981)).
16. See id. at 900 n.7 (citing JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT
OF CLINICAL TECHNIQUES (1981)).
17. See JOHN MONAHAN, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE CLINICAL PREDICTION
OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981); MONAHAN, supra note 16.
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would be any fewer errors if the psychiatrists were out of the picture and the
matter were left entirely to the unguided discretion of jurors.
In my opinion, these considerations influenced the Court to rule in favor of
the State. For an intellectually honest institution like the United States
Supreme Court, however, a response to the social science research had to be
found. The Court could not simply say that the prediction errors have not
been proven, or that the research was flawed. Instead, it came up with what
I believe to be one of the Court's most memorable rationalizations: "Neither
petitioner nor the [American Psychiatric] Association suggests that psychia-
trists are always wrong with respect to future dangerousness, only most of the
time.""
Lockhart v. McCree 9 presented the Court with a similar dilemma. The
claimant presented high quality, well-replicated research showing that the
process of "Witherspooning" jurors2° -which we have heard a lot about here
today-often biases the guilt trial by making jurors more conviction-prone.
The research record on this issue, however, was not as strong as it was in
Barefoot, and the Court felt free to reject it (unfairly, I believe) as flawed in
ways that were impossible to correct.2'
Now I would like to turn briefly to the issue of race. There has also been
a long dialogue in the courts on the issue of race and the death penalty. It
started in 1966 when Marvin Wolfgang presented compelling evidence of
race-of-defendant discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty for
rape in Arkansas. 22 His data were presented in Maxwell v. Bishop,23 an
Arkansas decision challenging an individual death sentence. Then-Judge Harry
Blackmun, sitting on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, denied relief to the
black defendant on a methodological ground. The results showing a pattern
of purposeful discrimination throughout the state against black defendants
were based on a sample of cases that had been randomly drawn. The fatal
flaw was that the sample did not include the claimant's case or any other
cases from his county; therefore, no relief was available.24
18. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901.
19. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
20. This refers to the constitutionally permissible practice of excluding from capital trials, for cause,
prospective jurors whose views about the death penalty would prevent them from giving appropriate
consideration to all sentencing options, including the death penalty. The term comes from the case of
Witherspoon v. Illinois, which involved an earlier and stricter test for excluding death penalty opponents
from the jury. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
21. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 168-73; see also Ellsworth, supra note 13, at 189-204 (reviewing the
Court's treatment of the social science research on death-qualified juries).
22. See Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death Penalty, 407
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCt. 119 (1973).
23. 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
24. Id. at 146-47. The evidence was also faulted for failure to show that "the petit jury which tried
and convicted Maxwell acted in his case with racial discrimination." Id. at 147. The issue of racial
discrimination in the use of the death penalty finally reached the Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia,
which challenged the constitutionality of death as punishment for rape. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). The
petitioner presented evidence of racial discrimination in rape cases, Petitioner's Brief at 52-56, Coker
(No. 75-5444), but the Court banned the use of the death penalty for rape as a disproportionate
punishment without reference to the issue of racial discrimination. Ellsworth, supra note 13, at 185.
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In the study of homicide cases, where we have seen the most extensive
analyses of race discrimination, the pioneer was Bill Bowers. In some very
creative work in the 1970's, he sensitized the courts and the entire research
community to the nature and implications of race-of-victim discrimination."
Although Bowers' early work was persuasive, it was limited by small numbers
of control variables in the FBI data set with which he was working. This gave
the Fifth Circuit a methodological justification, when he presented his data in
cases there in the 1970's and 1980's, to say that race-of-victim discrimination
had not been proven.
This early research, including work in progress by Barry Nakell,2 6
provided the foundation for the work that I did in Georgia with two
colleagues, George Woodworth and Charles Pulaski. We also studied carefully
the methodological critiques in Maxwell and in the Fifth Circuit cases that
rejected Bowers' work. We were determined to do our best to overcome the
omitted-variable problems that had weakened the persuasiveness of his work.
In the end, with the help of grants from the Justice Department and the
Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, we developed empirical evidence
suggesting that, on average, Georgia prosecutors were more likely to seek a
death sentence and Georgia juries were more likely to impose a death
sentence in white-victim cases." We also found that these effects were
particularly concentrated in what we characterized as the "mid-range" of
cases-those cases where there truly was a close choice as to the life or death
decision. It turned out that Warren McCleskey's was located in this category
of cases.
McCleskey's lawyers argued that the statistical evidence we presented
supported a presumption that race had influenced decisions in his case, and
that the State had failed to rebut that presumption. As a consequence,
McCleskey argued, his proof established a violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
The Court's dilemma here was real. Race discrimination is an important
constitutional matter. In other contexts, under both the Constitution and the
civil rights laws, the Court has generally upheld similar claims of racial
discrimination. A grant of relief for McCleskey, however, could threaten the
legitimacy of death sentencing in Georgia and possibly beyond. At the very
least, such a ruling would complicate its administration.
In McCleskey v. Kemp,28 five Justices voted to reject Warren McCleskey's
claim. They could have done so on the methodological grounds suggested by
the trial court, but that approach could have been construed as an invitation
to the social science community to cure the defects and return to court another
25. See WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982
(1984).
26. See BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY
(1987).
27. See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 185-88 (1990).
28. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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day. Instead, as it did in Lockhart, the Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Powell, rejected the claim by establishing burdens of proof for the use of
statistical evidence to establish discrimination in death penalty cases that were
impossible to meet.
The Court's justification, based on federalism concerns, had some
plausibility. But the methodological arguments about the impossibility of
proving discrimination in a death-sentencing system were quite unpersuasive.
So also were the suggestions that these disparities are inevitable in the
system, and that abolition is the only real cure for the problem. On these
points, an internal memorandum by Justice Scalia is particularly relevant. His
memo surfaced recently in Justice Marshall's papers when they were opened
at the Library of Congress. It was a short note to all the Justices, written three
months before the McCleskey decision. In it, Justice Scalia rejects Justice
Powell's methodological arguments, but goes on to state that race discrimina-
tion in the death penalty is "'real, acknowledged in the decisions of this
Court, and ineradicable."'
' 29
Where did the McCleskey data figure into all thiS, particularly for Justice
Powell, the key swing vote and author of the majority opinion? Even though
the Court accepted the validity of our research, the trial court's very strong
criticism of the methodology left lingering doubts, which were carried over
into Justice Powell's footnotes. Also, the research was complex and difficult
to understand. Further, it has been reported to me that Justice Powell was
uncomfortable basing any decision on statistical evidence.
But perhaps most important, in my estimation, is that race-of-victim
discrimination does not raise the same sort of moral concerns as race-of-
defendant discrimination-even though, from a constitutional standpoint,
discrimination on the basis of any racial aspect of the case is illegitimate.
Justice Powell may well have voted differently if the evidence had shown
race-of-defendant discrimination rather than race-of-victim discrimination.
After all, it is the defendants who pick their victims.
In addition, the core race-of-victim findings do not conform to ordinary
knowledge about race discrimination. In this regard, it is worth noting that
most lay and many professional people who know anything about the case
think that what we actually established was race-of-defendant discrimination,
not race-of-victim discrimination.
After McCleskey, the dialogue on race and the death penalty shifted to
Congress. In 1991 and again last year, the House of Representatives approved
what is known as the Racial Justice Act,3" which would have bypassed
McCleskey and permitted condemned prisoners to raise statistical challenges
29. David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the "Inevitability" of Racial Discrimination in Capital
Sentencing and the "Impossibility" of Its Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 51 WASH. & LEE L.
Rv. 359, 371 n.46 (1994) (quoting Memorandum from Antonin Scalia, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court,
to the Conference of the Justices, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 6, 1987), at 1 (copy on file with the
Washington & Lee Law Review)).
30. See H.R. 4092, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 901 (1992); see also Baldus et al., supra note 29, at
426-27 (providing a chronology of the legislative action with respect to H.R. 4092).
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to their death sentences on the ground of race. Those challenges would have
been evaluated under standards and presumptions similar to those used in Title
VII employment discrimination cases and jury discrimination cases under the
14th Amendment. In both those years, however, the measure was killed in a
conference committee.
Supporters of the Racial Justice Act gathered some strength for their
position from a General Accounting Office study which reviewed all of the
literature on race-of-victim discrimination and put its imprimatur on it-the
whole corpus of twenty-eight studies-suggesting that it showed real
effects.3' Also, during the period since MeCleskey, no one has repudiated or
invalidated any of the findings in this research.
Nevertheless, most opposition to the new legislation was based on three key
McCleskey-like themes. First, existing race-of-victim discrimination research
is unreliable and does not establish the reality of race-of-victim discrimina-
tion. Second, for methodological reasons, race discrimination simply cannot
be proven. And third, even if you could prove it, racial discrimination cannot
be corrected, without either de facto abolition of the death penalty, or a
requirement that prosecutors use "quotas" to guide their charging decisions.
My research colleagues and I think that these are specious claims, which we
address in a recent Washington and Lee Law Review article.32
In closing, the recent statements of Justice Powell and Justice Blackmun
provide additional evidence of the long-term percolating effects of social
science research on elite and public opinion. Both Powell and Blackmun now
believe that the death penalty experience of the last twenty years was a
failure, and that the system should be declared unconstitutional. Justice
Blackmun was clearly influenced by the cumulative evidence of the arbitrari-
ness, discrimination, and miscarriages of justice documented since 1973."3
In contrast, Justice Powell seems much more concerned that the death penalty
system cannot be made to work properly, and that the public attributes this
failure to the Court, which has the effect of undercutting the legitimacy of the
institution he loves so dearly.3 4
I have every expectation that the findings of the Capital Jury Project will
further legitimate the opinions of Justice Powell and Justice Blackmun, and
substantially enrich the dialogue I have described. The challenge for you, as
researchers and litigators, is how best to use this new and exciting resource.
31. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES
PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5 (1990).
32. See Baldus et al., supra note 29.
33. See Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1129 (1994) (mrnem.) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), denying
cert. to 998 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1993).
34. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451-54 (1994).
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